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I. INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Katrina was the most devastating natural disaster to strike
the United States in recent history.' Her catastrophic winds and rain left
New Orleans and much of the Gulf Coast in the gravest of conditions.2
Homes were "smashed," levees broke, and rising floodwaters swallowed
80% of New Orleans's homes, parishes and lives.3 Within hours, the
region "plung[ed]" into chaos. 4
Even the New Orleans Superdome-the last stronghold for thousands
of evacuees who sought refuge during and after the storm-was
crumbling.' Basic necessities of food, water, and sanitation were non1. John Pain, HurricaneSeason Ends; Storms Don't, PHILA. INQ., Nov. 30, 2005, at A06
(reporting that Hurricane Katrina killed more than 1300 citizens and accumulated $34.4 billion in
insured losses-becoming the deadliest and most expensive hurricane in recent time). Hurricane
Katrina made landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border at 6:10 a.m. CDT on August 29,2005.
Graham Brink & Aaron Sharockman, Katrina's Strike Could End Up the Most Costly Ever, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at IA.
2. See Pain, supra note 1, at A06.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Hurricane Katrina Timeline, at http://www.dkosopedia.com/index.php/Hurricane_
Katrina timeline (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
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existent.6 Fighting and other violence were reported, and emergency7
responders feared the "simmering crowd stuck inside a stifling arena.",
Outside, the stench of garbage and corpses floating in the floodwater
seized the city.' Desperate for survival, "terrified" victims "screamed" for
local, state, or federal officials-for anyone-to help.9
At the same time, the Louisiana National Guard was also flailing for
assistance. ° Rushing water flooded their headquarters, crippling
communications and emergency vehicles. 1 In fact, the National Guard was
forced to dedicate much of the first twenty-four hours after the storm to
protecting their base and rescuing their soldiers. 12 To help assist Louisiana,
National Guard units from surrounding sister states were deployed into the
area, but once assembled, some were not allowed to enter the area. 3 Sister
4
states' police officers were also slowed from aiding in the relief effort.
First responders' hands were tied-by red tape. 5
In the days that followed Hurricane Katrina, the flood waters subsided.
But a man-made disaster-the total breakdown of federal, state, and local
government communication-continued to swell.' 6 Finally, one full week
after the storm, active duty military personnel trickled into the region to
6. Dennis Murphy, And Now, A Hurricane of Anger in New Orleans (Sept. 1, 2005),
availableat http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 9148014/#050901c (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
7. Id.
8. Anna Badkhen, HurricaneKatrina:Relief Effort Response Like Second Disaster,S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 11, 2005, at A19.
9. See id.
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin himself pleaded with the nation, saying, "[t]his
is a desperate SOS" on Thursday, September 1-three days after the storm. See Hurricane Katrina
Timeline, supra note 5.
10. Scott Shane & Thorn Shanker, Storm and Crisis: The Response; When Storm Hit,
National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at Al.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
(reporting that the day the storm hit, the New Mexico Guard was ready to move
into the area, but a breakdown of communication with officials in Louisiana delayed their arrival
for three days).
14. See Badkhen, supra note 8, at A19.
15. See id. One Texas police officer recounted, "It's unbelievable: They wouldn't let us help
because we weren't deputized .... They're in desperate need of help and they're not letting us
work!" Id.
16. See Dave Walker, 'Those Images Will Haunt Me Forever': CBS Newsman Will Never
ForgetHis Reports From New OrleansAfter Katrina,NEW ORL. TIMES PIC., Oct. 3, 2005, at C07
(John Roberts, who had covered hurricanes for more than 15 years, was shocked at "how the
emergency response fell so completely flat.").

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

join forces with National Guard members. 17 Together, the units restored
law, resources and hope.' 8 Under the cooperative leadership of Louisiana
National Guard Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, and Army Lt. Gen. Russel
Honore,' 9 military and state soldiers set up command centers on the
ground, while Air Force and Coast Guard rescue teams patrolled the skies
in search of survivors stranded on rooftops.2" State and local officials
applauded the arrival of the military,2 but others criticized whether such
human devastation could have been minimized if the military had been
able to reach the hurricane victims sooner.22
In 1878, the U.S. Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA),23
a law enacted to shield civilians from military power by criminally
penalizing any person who calls upon the military to enforce domestic law.
A posse comitatus 24 is a group of citizens called together to help local law
enforcement keep the peace or conduct rescue operations.2 ' As presently
codified, the law provides that:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
17. Army News Service, 82ndAirborne to Join More Than 30K Troops in HurricaneRelief
(Sept. 4, 2005), http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?storyid-key-=7847 (last visited Feb. 9,
2006).
18. See id
19. Robert Travis Scott, PoliticsDelayed Troop Dispatch to NO., NEW ORL. TIMES PiC.,
Dec. 11, 2005, at 1.
20. See id.
21. Some of the most substantial praise for military domestic involvement came from New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin. He stated:
Well, I'll tell you this, and I'll give the president some credit on this. He sent one
John Wayne dude down here that can get some stuff done. And his name is
General Honore. And he came off the doggawn [sic] chopper, and he started
cussing and people started moving. And he is getting some stuff done. They ought
to give this guy-they don't wanna [sic] give it to me-they give this guy full
authority, and he'll get things done, and we can save some people.
Democraticunderground.com, Transcript: Ray Nagin Interview-Black on White (Sept. 2, 2005),
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az-viewall&address - 104x4575901
(last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
22. See Dave Moniz & Matt Kelley, Military'sRole in DisastersReconsidered,USA TODAY,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 06A.
23. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1385 (2000).
24. Literally, the "power of the county." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1183 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Id.
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otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.26
The PCA preserves the idea that the military is not to be used as a
domestic police force.2 7 However, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the
present-day effectiveness of this law is suspect.28 There are conflicting
viewpoints as to whether this law still serves a valid purpose by ensuring
the separation of military and civilian authority, or whether it is nothing
more than a blockade in the way of mobilizing the U.S. military in times
of national catastrophe. After September 11th, many of the law's
opponents called for its repeal; 29 Hurricane Katrina's devastation has
similarly resulted in a strong revival of efforts to change or strike down the
law.3°
This Note will analyze the Posse Comitatus Act and its application to
U.S. federal disaster response and relief.3 ' Part I will discuss the historical
origins of the PCA. Part II will define the scope of the PCA, and will
introduce possible exceptions to the PCA. Part IH will scrutinize the
present-day propriety of the PCA based upon opposing factual and legal
viewpoints. Finally, Part IV will offer recommendations for the PCA in an
attempt to clarify the law's procedural role in today's society.

26. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1385 (2000).
27. See generally Sean J. O'Hara, The Posse Comitatus Act Applied to the Prosecutionof
Civilians, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 767 (2005) (explaining how the PCA serves to restrict military
involvement in domestic law enforcement).
28. See, e.g., Moniz & Kelley, supranote 22, at 06A.
29. See, e.g., Jack H. McCall Jr. & Brannon P. Denning, Mission Im-Posse-Ble: The Posse
ComitatusAct and Use of the Military in Domestic Law Enforcement, 39 TENN. B.J. 26 (2003).
30. Leading the charge for PCA changes is Senator John Warner of Virginia. He and
members of the Bush administration seek changes that would, in part, empower active-duty federal
troops to engage in directly enforcing local laws, and allow the President to federalize state
National Guard without request from a state governor, and establish a central command center to
immediately take over logistics, security, and supplies. See Bob Barr, Liberties Take Another Hit
After Katrina,ATL. JOU. CONST., Sept. 21, 2005, at A19.
31. The Posse Comitatus Act is the center of discussion in a variety of domestic issues.
Recently, the implications of the PCA have been analyzed in its relationship to the military's
intervention in fighting domestic terrorism, securing our borders from illegal immigration, and
defending against drugs traffickers. However, this Note will only focus on the relationship between
the law and natural disaster relief.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

To gain full insight into a law's propriety, a legal observer ought to
empathize with circumstances present at a law's inception.32 In fact, some
sociologists believe that an observant who fails to account for the societal
realities present at a law's inception may be ill-prepared to make a valid
assessment of the law's true merits.33 Thus, to properly critique the
arguments for and against the practicality of the PCA, it is vital to engage
the law as a participant-not simply an observer.34 To that end, it is
necessary to probe the history behind the PCA and step into the drafters'35
shoes to understand the context around which the PCA came to exist.

After understanding what
the goals of the law were, one can better decide
36
what the rule of law is.

A. The Revolutionary Roots of the PCA
The origin of the Posse Comitatus Act is as old as the United States.37
The pre-Revolutionary era was one of the early showings of American
distaste of standing armies.38 In the years leading to war, American
39
colonists found themselves in frequent clashes with the British Army.
The city of Boston served as the epicenter of American discontent. The
growing hostility reached "incendiary" levels by the spring of 1770, when
British troops shot and killed five colonists rioting against the British
32. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 25 (1966).

33. HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND REUGION 38 (1974).
34. SKOLNICK, supranote 32, at 25 (noting that to achieve maximum effectiveness, one must
become at least a limited participant and "must empathize with the situation of his subjects").
35. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 666 (1958).
36. Id.
37. See Captain M.E. Bowman, The Military Role in Meeting the Threat of Domestic
Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 209, 211 (1990).
38. See Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law

Enforcement, 21 YALE L.&POL'YREV. 383,389-90(2003). However, some scholars feel that only
a minority of citizens truly wanted to curb the power of the military, and that in fact, the majority
was more concerned with having "a weak national government incapable of securing life, liberty,
and property." Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse ComitatusAct: Setting the Record Straight
on 124 Years of Mischiefand MisunderstandingBefore Any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L.
REV. 86, 93-94 (2003).

39. Kealy, supra note 38, at 389-90.
40. See id.

20061

MILITARY LAW: WINDS OF CHANGE-EXKAMINING

THE PRESENT-DAYPROPRIETY OF THE PCA

479

occupation. 4' This event, now known as the Boston Massacre, crystallized
American bitterness toward military entanglement in local affairs.42
In the Declaration of Independence, patriots formalized American
opposition to a standing military. The declaration specifically attacked
King George i1's practices of keeping soldiers active during times of
peace, 43 exercising the military over civilian control," and quartering
troops among the population of the colonies.45 Anti-military sentiment
spilled over in the Revolutionary War, where the colonists succeeded in
repelling the British regime."
After the colonies won their freedom from the English crown, new
rules for the republic were necessary. 47 The Founding Fathers stressed the

importance of safeguarding the personal liberties that had been
compromised while under British occupation. 48 Thus, at the Constitutional
Convention, one of the most contentious issues was how to reconcile the
protection of civil liberties with the necessity of a strong, ready, military
force. 49 After lengthy and passionate debate, the U.S. Constitution's
approach to military-civilian relations was a convergence of these
competing concerns.5
One of the primary goals of the U.S. Constitution was to ensure that the
army remained subordinate to civilian authority.5 To this end, the
Founders relied on a system of checks and balances; the President-a
civilian-would act as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,52 but the
appropriation responsibilities for the military would lie in the hands of
41. Id.at 390.
42. See id.
43. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 13 (U.S. 1776) ("He has kept among us, in
times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our Legislatures.").
44. Id. para. 14 ("He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the
Civil Power.").
45. Id.paras. 16-17 ("For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting
them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit . .
46. Kealy, supra note 38, at 389-90.
47. Id. at 390.
48. Id.
49. See id.at 391 (noting that some delegates favored a standing military for use against
attacking European nations or Indian tribes, but others believed that the need for a national military
was obviated by the presence of state militias).
50. Id. Those who were strongly against a standing army included Luther Martin, Alexander
Hamilton, and James Madison, agreeing that strong military frequently resulted in infringements
of rights. See id.at 391-92.
51. See, e.g., McCall & Denning, supra note 29, at 28.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Congress.53 The drafters also declared that citizens shall have a right
against the involuntary quartering of soldiers in their private homes during
times of peace. 4 These checks and balances served as preventative
measures to keep the military detached from daily civilian life." Thus, the
first American citizens cautiously welcomed a military presence into the
new democracy.
B. The Continued Use of Military Over Domestic Affairs
Despite the Founders' best intentions to limit military entanglement in
civilian affairs, using the standing military to attain domestic order proved
far too convenient, and thus became a "feature" of new American life. 6 In
1854, U.S. Attorney General Caleb Cushing, recognizing the utility of the
immense strength of the federal militia, formally defined the extent of a
posse comitatus.57 Cushing declared that all people above the age of
fifteen, whether civilian or military, could be forced to serve in a posse
comitatus5 Cushing's actions again lent credence to a federalized law
enforcement that had been politically disavowed since the days of the
Revolution.59
The Cushing doctrine was used extensively in the South to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Act.6" Under the Act, a sheriff or marshal could quickly
summon both civilian and military forces to capture and return runaway
slaves. 6 This use of a posse comitatus was widely disfavored by the North
because of strong abolitionist sentiments.62 The growth of Union and

53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
55. See, e.g., Kealy, supranote 38, at 391-92.
56. See, e.g., Felicetti & Luce, supra note 38, at 97-98. The country's early Presidents called
on the military in a variety of circumstances. In 1794, President George Washington used federal
troops to quell the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, President Thomas Jefferson used
the military to counter Aaron Burr's attempted invasion of Spanish terrain, and as late as 1832,
President Andrew Jackson sent the military to South Carolina to quell an early secession attempt.
Id. at 98-99.
57. See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466,473 (1854). This opinion is known as the Cushing Doctrine.
The PCA was specifically designed to overturn it. 7 CONG. REC. 4241-47 (1878).
58. See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466 (1854).
59. See Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 107, 109-10 (2003).
60. See, e.g., Felicetti & Luce, supra note 38, at 99.
61. See id. at 99-101.
62. See id. at 100.
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Confederate armies prior to the Civil War pushed the traditional limits of
domestic military power to the brink.63
Military control in the United States peaked during the post-Civil War
Reconstruction era.' Following the war, the federal military was used
regularly to accomplish police objectives in the South under the authority
of the Reconstruction Act of 1867.65 The Act gave the North-controlled
Congress the power to establish military rule in ten former confederate
states after those states refused to ratify the 14th Amendment. 66 Military
power also usurped state governments and took over local law
enforcement.67 Soldiers forcibly seized entire Southern legislative bodies
and installed Northern politicians--carpetbaggers-into the local
governments.68 Thus, following the Civil War, it was the Southerners
that
69
activity.
state
over
control
military
of
notion
began to resent the
The presidential election of 1876 brought the post-Civil war conflict
over domestic military use to a head.70 In that year, Northern Republican
Rutherford B. Hayes won a narrow election over the Southern Democrat
candidate Samuel J. Tilden.7 During the election, former Union General
and President Ulysses Grant ordered soldiers to stand guard over Southern
polling districts to curb voting violations and ensure that newly freed
African Americans were given the equal opportunity to participate in the
63. See id. The Civil War sparked the nation's first true mass army. This military growth led
to significant incursions into domestic freedoms in both Southern and Northern states. The South
was subjected to martial law, and President Lincoln suspended writ of habeas corpus in Union and
Confederate border states. These actions gave Union military nearly unfettered power to arrest,
search, and try citizens before military tribunals nationwide. See McCall & Denning, supra note
29, at 28-29.
64. Canestaro, supra note 59, at 111.
65. Id. at 111-12.
66. Id.
67. See id. For example, the governors of Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana and
Texas were all removed by soldiers, and countless other civilian officials were similarly forced
from their jobs and replaced with military officers. See McCall & Denning, supra note 29, at 30.
68. Canestaro, supranote 59, at 112.
69. See id. It is interesting to see the shift from Northern to Southern opposition to the use
of a posse comitatus. Perhaps the Northern use of a posse comitatus was a form of backlash against
atrocious Southern uses of the military to discriminate against African Americans prior to the Civil
War. Likewise, the Southern resentment ofNorthem uses of a posse comitatus use may be backlash
to the significant political corruption that the North was spreading throughout the region. The
theory of backlash is helpful to understand actions that result from contextual change. See LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 145 (rev. ed. 1969).
70. Canestaro, supranote 59, at 113.
71. Id.
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election.72 Southern Democrats were outraged that the federal military was
mobilized to enforce local election laws. 73 Thus, on the same day that the
presidency was awarded to Hayes, the legislature proposed a rider to an
existing military appropriations bill that barred the use of the military to
execute domestic laws.74 After a series of revisions,75 President Hayes
finally signed the bill into law, and the PCA was formally enacted in
1878.76

IH. SCOPE OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

The PCA was broadly drafted with the intent to strike a compromise
between the Democrat-controlled Congress and the Republican
administration.77 The purposeful vagueness left the courts free to
determine to whom the PCA applies and to what extent it would be
controlling law.78 It also left the door open for legislatures to strengthen,
weaken, or modify the principles of the PCA through exceptions. This
section interprets the PCA by analyzing to what extent the law applies,
discussing how the court system has further shaped the boundaries of the
72. Id. at 112-13. Alternatively, some scholars believe that it was the soldiers themselves that
were guilty of undue influence over voters and other polling violations. See, e.g., C.T. Rossi, The
Posse Comitatus Act: Can We Maintain American Freedom Without It?, at http://www.
enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0802/0802posse.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
73. Canestaro, supra note 59, at 112-13. Outrage over federal troops guarding the polling
places coincided with voter fraud allegations, as Hayes won the presidency by the disputed electoral
votes of South Carolina, Louisiana and Florida. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Canestaro,supra note 59, at 113-15.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). The original Posse Comitatus Act was a rider to an
appropriations bill, approved on June 18, 1878. Army as Posse Comitatus, ch. 263 § 15:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of
the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose
of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by
act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any
of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this
section, and any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by
fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
77. See Canestaro, supra note 59, at 113-14; see Felicetti & Luce, supra note 38, at 115.
78. Mark David "Max" Maxwell, The Enduring Vitality of the Posse ComitatusAct of1878,
37 PROSECUTOR 34 (2003).
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law, and introducing other laws that may be construed as exceptions to the
law.
A. Statutory Interpretationof the PCA
The PCA applies only to Army and Air Force personnel who are on
active military duty.79 Although an earlier PCA draft prohibited "all
ground and naval forces" from domestic activity, ° the Navy and the U.S.
Marine Corps are not explicitly limited by the current language of the
PCA. 8 However, the Department of Defense placed PCA-like prohibitions
on these branches of the military in 1986.82 The only branch of the armed
forces that may act without PCA constraints is the U.S. Coast Guard, as
Congress has expressly vested law enforcement functions to this group.83
The status of the service member is equally important in determining
whether the PCA is applicable.8 4 The PCA applies only to those active
duty military persons enlisted in federal service. 5 As such, the PCA
applies to the National Guard during those times that the guardsmen are
called into federal service, but not when National Guard members are on
a normal status of state duty.86 This distinction is consistent with the intent
of the PCA to not limit the activities of state militia.87
The language of the PCA requires either an act of Congress or a
circumstance expressly authorized by the Constitution (such as a
presidential or executive order) in order to mobilize active-duty armed
forces.88 The PCA also provides penalties for failure to comply with the
law.89 However, no person has ever been prosecuted under the statute. 9
More typically, the PCA is cited as a defense when a defendant asserts that
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
80. 7 CONG. REC. 3586 (1878).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
82. U.S. Dep't of Def., Directive No. 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials encl. 4, § A(2)(c), at 4-6 (Jan. 15, 1986) (extending the PCA's application
to the Navy and Marine Corps "as a matter of DoD policy").
83. The Coast Guard's law enforcement role is well-recognized since the founding of its
precursor, the Revenue Marine, in 1790. Moreover, the Coast Guard is statutorily authorized to
engage in law enforcement activity. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
84. Canestaro, supranote 59, at 124.
85. See Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999).
86. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
87. Matthew Carlton Hammond, The PosseComitatus Act: A Principlein Need ofRenewal,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 964 (1997).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Hammond, supranote 87, at 961.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

evidence of an alleged crime was inappropriately obtained by the federal
government. 91
Thus, the statutory language ofthe PCA is sparse, giving little guidance
in meaning or application. The PCA's obscurity is compounded by the fact
it has never been enforced, 92 prompting one to question whether it has any
validity at all.
B. JudicialInterpretationof the PCA
The PCA reflects the broad policy embedded within American history
that civilians should not be subordinate to military rule. 93 However, the
judicial branch has narrowed the scope of the PCA by limiting what
triggers a violation of the PCA.94
In Lairdv. Tatum, the U.S. Supreme Court first categorized the extent
to which the military could breach the domestic sphere. 95 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger found that the military's mere presence in
domestic affairs does not chill civilian rights per se.96 To rise to the level
of an infringement of protected liberties, the military involvement must be
"regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory." 97
While the LairdCourt did not explicitly decide what qualifies as a PCA
violation, the federal courts looked to this rule in the 1970s when they
were asked to decide a series of cases that collectively became known as
the Wounded Knee decisions.98 These cases all stemmed from a standoff
at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, where looters raided the Wounded Knee
trading post and took a number of hostages.99 State authorities, federal law
enforcement, and the U.S. military were present during the encounter, and
91. Id.
92. O'Hara, supra note 27, at 773 (stating that while the PCA is a criminal statute, no one
has ever been prosecuted under the law).
93. Charles Bloeser, A Statute in Need of Teeth: Revisiting the Posse ComitatusAct After
9/11, 50 FED. LAW. 24, 26 (2003).
94. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916
(D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974); United States v.
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975).
95. Laird, 408 U.S. at 1.
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 11.
98. Kealy, supra note 38, at 401.
99. In 1973, over 100 looters from the American Indian Movement raided the trading post
at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, and took a number of residents hostage for several days.
Jaramillo,380 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
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eventually the aggressors were captured.' ° A number of the defendants
argued that the U.S. military violated the PCA during the conflict, and that
any evidence acquired from the violation would have to be suppressed
under the exclusionary rule.'
Three federal courts dismissed this
argument based upon each court's interpretation as to what
military
0 2
PCA.
the
under
laws"
the
"execute
to
deemed
was
conduct
In United States v. Red Feather,the court defined a PCA violation as
any "direct active use of Army or Air Force personnel."'0 3 This holding
was consistent with the Supreme Court's finding in Laird,but went a step
further to establish a passive versus active distinction.' °4 Federal District
Judge Bogue wrote that "the intent of Congress in enacting this statute...
was to prevent the direct active use of federal troops, one soldier or many,
to execute the laws."'0 5 Applying this rule, the court admitted evidence
showing that military personnel took an active role in direct law
enforcement, but held that evidence of military
engagement in a passive
06
role would not amount to a PCA violation.1
In United States v. Jaramillo, the court's PCA violation test was
centered on the question of whether the use of the military "pervaded the
activities" of the civilian law enforcers.'0 7 Federal District Judge Urban
found that the provision of equipment and supplies was not itself a
violation of the PCA.'° 8 However, this court probed deeper to determine
whether the military observers-although remaining on the periphery of
the direct conflict-had too much influence over civilian law enforcement
decisions regarding hostage negotiations, use of equipment, and the
amount of force used to quell the standoff.0 9 The court reasoned that the
more influence the military had over a civilian law enforcement operation,
100. See id. The military officers were called to the area "to observe conditions and
developments at Wounded Knee for the purpose of advising the Department of Defense as to
whether [F]ederal troops should be used at Wounded Knee." United States v. McArthur, 419 F.
Supp. 186, 192 n.2 (D.N.D. 1975).
101. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 103-15.
103. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 921-23 (D.S.D. 1975).
104. See id. at 923.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court outlined a comprehensive list of activities that would constitute an active,
impermissible role, including an arrest, seizure of evidence, and search of person. Id. at 925. The
court also gave examples of permissibly passive military functions, including mere presence,
preparation of contingency plans, delivery of military equipment and training. Id.
107. United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974).
108. Id. at 1381.
109. Id. at 1380-81.
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the more "pervasive" the military became, and the more likely the
military's role could breach the boundaries of the PCA." ° Although the
court intimated that the military muddied the distinction between civil and
military law enforcement, it nevertheless concluded that the conduct
did
1
not reach so far as to obstruct civilian law enforcement officers."
The court in UnitedStates v. McArthur looked at both the "direct active
participation" test and the "pervaded the activities" test in analyzing a
violation of the PCA.12 The court revisited the rule in Lairdand structured
its PCA test around the individual subjected to the PCA violation." 3
Specifically, the court ruled that if the military personnel subjected a
civilian to "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory" military power, then
the military has exercised power beyond which the PCA allows." 4
Because the military's actions were not deemed to be "regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature," the court found no violation of the
15
PCA.

1

Following the Wounded Knee cases, the federal court in United States
v. Yunis" 6 further clarified the Lairdand McArthur decisions. The court
found that regulatory power was that which "controls or directs";" 7
8 and
proscriptive power was that which "prohibits or condemns";"
'" 19
force."
coercive
some
"exerts
compulsory power was that which
Thus, the judicial system has shed limited light on what conduct results
in military personnel's "execut[ion] of the law."' 2° Still, much PCA
interpretation remains hidden in shadows of ambiguity.
C. Statutory Exceptions to the PCA Relevant to NaturalDisasterRelief
The minimal judicial interpretation of the PCA has left the law
vulnerable to a number of exceptions. In fact, the PCA does not actually
110.
111.
112.
(8th Cir.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Seeid. at 1379-80.
See id. at 1381.
United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.S.D. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 1275
1976).
See id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891, 895-96 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086

(D.C. Cir. 1991).
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 895.
Id.at896.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 102.
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prohibit exceptions to its application.' 2' Rather, the PCA allows explicit
constitutional exceptions and legislative enactments to pre-empt its
power. 122 The Insurrection Act and the Stafford Act are the two major
statutory exceptions that blur the PCA's application to natural disaster
relief.123
1. The Insurrection Act
The Insurrection Act is a long-standing, express exception to the
PCA. 24
' The Act confers authority to both state and federal persons to seek
U.S military assistance when an insurrection occurs."' A state izgislative
or governor request will trigger the Act, and under cerLht- circumstances,
the President alone may prompt military action.121 Moreover, the Act
mandates that the President federalize and use the T ational Guard or
federal forces to suppress a disturbance if it:
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United
States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived
of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution
and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of ihat State are
unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to
give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States
27
or impedes the course of justice under those laws.1
As such, the President's power to take action under the Act is not impaired
28
by the PCA. 1
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) ("except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress").
122. Id.

123. There are more statutes and Department of Defense Directives that run counter to the
PCA, but because they do not directly deal with natural disaster relief, they are beyond the scope
of this Note. For information regarding these laws and directives, see YOUNG, THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT OF 1878: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xvi-xvii (2003) (listing 25 different
exceptions to the PCA).
124. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2001).
125. Id.

126. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 331, with 10 U.S.C. § 332.
127.

10 U.S.C. § 333.

128. 41 Op. Atty. Gen. (Nov. 7, 1957).
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What constitutes an insurrection is not clearly defined under the statute.
Early case law describes an insurrection as an "open and active
opposition" to the execution of law so "formidable as for the time being
to defy the authority of the United States."' 2 9 Such insurrection need not
be violent nor even likely to succeed in order for governmental action to
be taken. 3 ' The Act allows the President authority to mobilize the military
when "unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or
rebellion... make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States
in any State.... " 3 ' If such incident occurs, the military or militia may step
into the civilian sphere and assert necessary authority-as determined
solely by the President-to enforce state law."32 Furthermore, the rules of
engagement for the extent of military force must first be approved by the
33
Attorney General before orders are given down the chain of command.
The reach of the Insurrection Act is tremendous. Courts have found that
the President has plenary authority to use the armed forces under this
exception; these decisions are not subject to judicial review.' 34 It also has
been held that soldiers can enter a state under the Insurrection Act for the
purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed.'35 This entry is justified
because the Insurrection Act predates the PCA, and the drafters of the
PCA specifically stated that the law was not to nullify the laws already in
effect. 136 Furthermore, the law provides that if state law enforcement
becomes debilitated, and local law enforcement is insufficient to protect
the safety of citizens, the military may be used to execute the laws of the
United States.' 37 Thus, the wording of the Insurrection Act demonstrates
that in certain situations, "military preservation and enforcement of
129. In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830-31 (D.C. Il.1894).
130. Id.
131. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2001).
132. Id.
133. 3 Fed. Reg. 47491, Exec. Order No. 12656, §§ 1101(2) and (8) (Nov. 18, 1998).
134. See Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (D.D.C.
1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (using troops to quell civil disorder is a decision
exclusive to the President and is not subject to judicial review).
135. U.S. Op. Atty. Gen 516,517 (1860); see also Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, Operational Law Handbook 356, 367 (Joseph B. Berger III et al. eds., 2004), availableat
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2OO4.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
136. CONG. REC. 3846, 4243 (1873). The Insurrection Act was part of title 69 of the Revised
Statutes of 1873 when the Posse Comitatus Act was enacted. Congressman Knott, who introduced
the provision, said: "this amendment expressly excepts those cases and those circumstances in
which troops are now authorized by any act of Congress to be employed in the enforcement of said
law." Id. at 3847.
137. Id.
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civilian law is appropriate; the policy
consideration underlying the Posse
38
absolute.'
not
is
Act
Comitatus
2. The Stafford Act
Congress recognized that natural disasters devastate all
139
people-including those individuals in charge of disaster relief response.
As such, the legislature enacted the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to provide extra support during
disasters when local and state governments are disrupted.140 As a whole,
the Stafford Act is an expansive piece of legislation that established
federal assistance, coordination, and funding guidelines before, during, and
after a natural disaster. 4 ' In part, the law permits the President to deploy
military personnel to help support state and local governments after a
major disaster.'42
The Act is formally triggered when a governor requests a declaration
from the President that the affected area is in fact a disaster. 4 3 However,
before presidential approval of such request, the governor must first show
that the state has begun execution of its own state disaster emergency
plan. " Upon presidential declaration of a disaster, the President may
authorize federal agencies (like FEMA) to "provide assistance essential to
meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major
disaster."' 45
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 377 n. I (4th Cir. 1974).
42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2000).
Id. § 5121 (2000).
See id.
Id. § 5170b(c), § 5195a(3), § 5196(c).
42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191(a) (2000).
Id.
Id. § 5170b(a). Such assistance includes:
(A) debris removal;
(B) search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass care, emergency
shelter, and provision of food, water, medicine, and other essential needs, including
movement of supplies or persons;
(C) clearance of roads and construction of temporary bridges necessary to the
performance of emergency tasks and essential community services;
(D) provision of temporary facilities for schools and other essential community services;
(E) demolition of unsafe structures which endanger the public;
(F) warning of further risks and hazards;
(G) dissemination of public information and assistance regarding health and safety
measures;

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

However, when a natural threat is looming, a governor may skip an
official call for federal disaster relief, and instead request that the President
utilize Department of Defense resources for the "purpose of performing on
public and private lands any emergency work which is made necessary by
such incident and which is essential for the preservation of life and
property. ' Emergency work is defined so as to include the "clearance
and removal of debris and wreckage and temporary restoration of essential
public facilities and services."' 47 The law is silent as to whether the
temporary restoration of law enforcement falls under the military scope of
emergency work. Once the President approves the request for military
support, armed forces, under the Department of Defense's direction, may
enter the disaster area for a maximum of ten days.14 8
The Act also permits the President to usurp a state request for
assistance when an emergency involves an area that is the "exclusive or
preeminent responsibility and authority" of the United States. 49 In those
instances, the President may "coordinate all disaster relief assistance
(including voluntary assistance) provided by federal agencies, private
organizations, and State and local governments."' 5 ° If this federal
assistance is in some way insufficient to accommodate for the emergency
at hand, the Act allows the President to "provide assistance with respect
to efforts to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, and
lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe."'' This section of the Act does
not define the source from which the President may look for assistance.
Read together, these provisions may be construed to allow the President
to command the military and state militia in civil law enforcement
activities regardless of a state's will-a practice that the PCA would
otherwise proscribe.
(H) provision oftechnical advice to State and local governments on disaster management
and control; and
(I) reduction of immediate threats to life, property, and public health and safety.
Id. § 5170b(a)(3).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1).
147. Id. § 5170b(c)(6)(B).
148. Id. § 5170b(c)(1).
149. Id. § 5191(b) (stating that while a President should correspond with a state governor
"when practical," the President's determination of a federal emergency may be independent of a
state governor's assessment of the situation).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(2).
151. Id. § 5192(b).
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Some scholars argue that the existence of the Insurrection and Stafford
Acts creates no PCA implications in the context of natural disaster
relief.51 2 They assert that the military is free to enter disaster areas because
it is not actively engaging in a law enforcement role.153 However, as in the
case of Hurricane Katrina, the military was called upon to bring both relief
and legal order back to the Gulf Coast. 5 4 Furthermore, when a natural
disaster as severe as Hurricane Katrina strikes, local, state, and nongovernmental agency relationships may become so strained that no clear
command, control, or communications can be recognized. The relationship
and communication between organizations are vital to effective execution
of law enforcement activities.' The military has a substantial role in
domestic law enforcement during a natural disaster; therefore, the PCA is
very relevant to natural disaster relief.
IV. THE PRESENT-DAY PROPRIETY OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

Rules in action must be congruent with rules as announced.'56 The PCA
has been a part of American jurisprudence for over a hundred years;
however, the letter of this law is seldom followed.'57 While announcing
that the military may not enforce domestic law, in present-day practice,
armed forces are often called upon to provide valuable domestic
152. See Maxwell, supranote 78, at 36 (asserting that DoD Directive 3025.15 is a sufficient
trigger for the military to legally enter a state without considering the Posse Comitatus Act); see
also Tom A. Gizzo & Tama S. Monoson, A Call to Arms: The Posse Comitatus Act and the Use
ofthe Military in The StruggleAgainstInternationalTerrorism, 15 PACE INT'LL. REv. 149, 156-57
(2003) (asserting that the Stafford Act amply allows the military to circumvent the PCA).
153. Hammond, supra note 87, at 971.
154. See, e.g., MilitaryDue to Move into New Orleans(Sept. 2,2005), http://www.cnn.com/
2005/WEATHER/09/02/katrina.impact/ (last visited Jan. 28,2006). The article recounts Governor
Blanco's message to her residents after the arrival of the troops:
"These are some of the 40,000 extra troops that I have demanded," Blanco said.
"They have M- 16s, and they're locked and loaded .... I have one message for
these hoodlums: These troops know how to shoot and kill, and they are more than
willing to do so if necessary, and I expect they will."
Id.
155. See Joseph B. Treaster, Storm and Crisis: Law Enforcement; Police Quitting,
Overwhelmed by Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1.
156. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 82 (rev. ed. 1969).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91. As no one has even been prosecuted under the
law, the law has never plainly been enforced.
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services.' This discrepancy between the written law and the applied law
triggers a need to question the validity of the PCA as law.
A. The Status of the PCA as Valid and EnforceableLaw
Before analyzing the merits for preserving or amending the PCA, a
preliminary jurisprudential inquiry is in order, to wit: Is the PCA still in
fact valid law? Legal positivist Hans Kelsen'59 developed a binary model
of legal validity based on a law's effectiveness." 6 He stressed that for a
law to be valid, the "legal norms"'' of the law must become and remain
effective. 62
' Conversely, a law loses its validity if its legal norms lose their
effectiveness.'63 In true positivist fashion, he rejected the notion that a law
could half exist.164
Kelsen described a loss of effectiveness when a legal norm is no longer
obeyed or applied. 65 To obey a legal norm is for citizens to behave in a
manner contrary to behavior which would constitute a sanction. 166 To
apply a legal norm is for officials to order and execute sanctions when a
citizen disobeys a law. 167 As such, legal norms fail when the command
attached to a law no longer remains. 68 Thus, under Kelsen's view, a law
may be validly recorded, but once it becomes ineffective, it is
constructively repealed.'69
Examining the PCA under Kelsen's model, one can make the argument
that the PCA is no longer valid law. That no one has been prosecuted
158. See supra text accompanying notes 124-51.
159. Hans Kelsen is thought of as one of the most preeminent legal positivist scholars of the
twentieth century. His legal theory rests on the idea of a hypothetical basic norm, upon which all
subsequent levels of a legal system are generated.
160. See Hans Kelsen, On the Pure Theory of Law, 1 ISRAEL L. REv. 1, 2 (1966) (a later
restatement of his traditional position).
161. Kelsen defines a legal norm as the "specific meaning of an act of will directed at a
definite human behavior." Id. Legal norms are created by legislative, judicial and administrative
acts. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Robert C.L. Moffat, The PerilsofPositivism or Lon Fuller'sLesson On Looking at
Law: Neither Science Nor Mystery--Merely Method, 10 HARv. J.L. & POL'Y 295,342 (1987); see
also Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law-Observations Prompted by Professor
Fuller'sNovel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668, 667-78 (1965).
165. Kelsen, supra note 160, at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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under the law indicates that the legal norms are unapplied. Similarly,
because broad judicial interpretation and statutory exceptions seem to
shrink the scope of the PCA, citizens-either intentionally or
unintentionally-may have disobeyed the law. Consequently, when the
legal norms inherent in the PCA waned, so ended its tenure as valid law.
A slightly alternative view of legal validity is that of famed American
legal Realist jurist Karl Llewellyn. 7 ' He believed that a law loses its
validity when it loses its power, rather than its command.' 7 ' To him, the
power of law anchors itself in what officials do, rather than what they
announce, because it is official action that constitutes the realistic
constructs of law. 72 As such, his approach defines the behavior of officials
as a model of law itself, where official action represents the order citizens
must follow. 173
Again, it appears that the PCA would not be held as valid under this
model. Through the enactment of exceptions, legal officials have defied
the intended boundaries of this law-not upheld them. 74
' Moreover, as the
PCA has no validity under a positivist view, government officials are the
only guide to the PCA's legal effect. 7 5 Because government officials
themselves do not agree on the meaning of the PCA, official actions are
conflicting, and thus, the law fails in its mission of stating a coherent set
of rules.
A unique outlook on legal validity is given by sociological jurist Lon
L. Fuller. 7 6 He believed that a law may have "varying degrees of
efficacy," and held that an unclear law is less a valid law than a clear
one.' 77 Unlike Kelsen, he believed that if a legal norm within a law was
wholly ineffective, the law itself could still remain valid.' This theory
supports finding some level of validity left in the PCA. Although the
170. Karl Llewellyn embraced the theory of Legal Realism. To this end, he supported judicial
discretion when deciding cases, and he is famous for his statement that what "officials do about
disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930 repr.

1960).
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id.
173. Moffat, supra note 164, at 322-24.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 124-51.
175. See supratext accompanying notes 170-73.
176. Lon L. Fuller, the late Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School,
was a middle-ground jurist who adopted portions of natural, positivist and sociological
interactionist approaches in his study of law.
177. FULLER, supra note 156, at 63 n.21. To Fuller, a law's degree of efficacy was dependent
upon its adherence to the principles of legality, discussed infra.
178. Id. at 63 n.21.
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principles of the PCA are not strongly adopted, obeyed, or enforced, there
may yet be a degree of legal validity remaining in the law.
Fuller also believed that a law's degree of moral reciprocity determined
the level of adherence and enforceability. 7 ' Specifically, he believed the
moral duty to obey law was intrinsically tied to reciprocity. ° When one
ceases to fulfill a duty to another, that person also "forfeits" the right to
receive the duties owed to him.'8 ' Likewise, when the government fails to
fulfill its duties, citizens arguably no longer owe a duty to the government
to remain lawful because the implicit reciprocal social contract is broken.
The government response to Hurricane Katrina was a prime example
of the government's critical departure from what was expected of them.
There is an implicit promise that the government would respond quickly
in a time of national crisis. In part, because of the PCA, it failed to make
good on this promise.8 2 This breakdown led some victims to abdicate their
role as lawful citizens and resort to illegal-but necessary-survival
behavior. 8 3 Furthermore, the government makes an implicit promise with
citizens to uphold and follow the rules of law which it itself creates. By the
government violating the PCA, it broke its promise with society. As such,
the peripheral consequences of the PCA weakened the moral duty of
citizens to obey the law.
Scrutinizing the PCA under Fuller's theories leaves open the question
of whether it remains valid and enforceable law. It still retains some
degree of efficacy, but also has the effect of dissuading citizens from their
179. Id. at 19-23.
180. Id. Social reciprocity is strongest when there is perceived equivalence in the exchange,
voluntary agreement, and a fluid relationship. Id. at 23.
181. Robert C.L. Moffat, ImplicitPromiseKeeping andFuller's InternalMorality ofLaw, Bft
I Rechtstheorie 217 (1991).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 9-22.
183. See id.; see also Administration is a NationalDisaster,BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2005,
at A14:
When I look at the images of this "looting" more closely, I see desperate people
scavenging whatever food and water they can find because they are hungry, and
no one has come to help them. I see women frantic for diapers and milk for their
babies, men grateful for flashlights to light the darkness, young people wading in
dangerously toxic waters urgently seeking medicine for the ill displaced residents
of the city.
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obligation to obey law. Accordingly, exploring the rationales for both
preserving and modifying the PCA are appropriate actions.
B. Rationalefor Keeping the PCA Intact
1. Preservation of American Identity
One argument for keeping the PCA intact stems from the position that
any change to, or repeal of, the law would breach a promise that is innately
valuable to the country's citizenry. Critics reference the nation's history
in asserting that any allowed increase of military power within the borders
would contradict the very reasons for this country's founding.' They
assert that the PCA is not an outdated historical relic as some believe. 8 6
Rather, proponents believe the PCA expresses the "inherited antipathy" of
American use of military troops for civil purposes."8 7
This attitude is congruent with naturalist legal theory. Natural law "is
comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that govern the behavior of
beings possessing reason and free will."' 88 It is inherently tied to morals
through the law's derivation from a human sense of right and wrong.8 9 As
such, if a law "deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a
" '
perversion of law."' In other words, an unjust law is no law at all.19
Consistent with the naturalist argument, citizens have a natural, human
right to be free from military rule. As such, this right cannot be alienated
by legislative changes.9 2 Any broadening of the PCA would be
184. See generallyMcCall & Denning, supra note 29; and Bloeser, supranote 93 (arguing that
a change in the PCA would be in conflict with the law's intent).
185. See Bloeser, supra note 93, at 30 ("The Posse Comitatus Act exists because our
Constitution established a nation in which civilians control the military").
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Eternal law, according to Thomas Aquinas, is the set of laws by which the universe is
ordered.
189. See Moffat, supra note 164, at 320-23.
190. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMATHEOLOGICA, PT. I-I, Q.95, art. 2, at 1014 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1912).
191. Naturalist scholar John Finnis asserts that the essential function of law is to provide a
justification for state coercion. Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot
provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power, and is hence not obligatory
in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of
law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law. See generallyJOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-81, 351-66 (1980).
192. Recall that this same naturalist argument was the focus of the Declaration of
Independence. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
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illegitimate based on the United States' historical tradition that its citizens
ought never be subordinate to military power.' 93 Changing or repealing the
PCA would inherently exceed the boundaries of law and consequently
create illegitimate law. 94
2. Retainer of State Sovereignty Over Federal Power
State sovereignty will continue to prevail over federal power if the
PCA remains unchanged. Law that permits the military to undermine state
rights may cause the country to respond with serious public malcontent. 195
Those in favor of the PCA emphasize that the drafters favored state militia
over standing armies, particularly in law enforcement roles. 96
Consequently, any embrace of more military involvement in domestic law
will aggravate the delicate balance between the dual sovereigns in this
area.
In fact, both state and federal officials are reluctant to compromise state
sovereignty. There is no clearer example of this tension than the exchange
between President Bush and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco in the
days that followed Hurricane Katrina. 97 On the day Katrina struck,
Governor Blanco requested that the President send "everything you've
got,"' 98 but did not specifically request federal troops-a procedural step
necessary for troop mobilization. 99 Though the need for the military was
"obvious" given the magnitude of the disaster, instead there ensued an
"academic" argument over federal and state command structure while
human suffering was taking place.200 President Bush finally authorized
troops via Blanco's request nearly a week after the storm struck. 20' The
transpiring events evidenced what can happen when a state sends unclear
messages and a President is "overly sensitive about overstepping" state
202
authority.
193. See generally FINNIS, supra note 191.
194. Id.
195. Michael Noone, Posse Comitatus:Preparingforthe Hearings,4 CHl. J. INT'LL. 193,199
(2003) (noting that military law enforcement involvement would be "un-American").
196. Seeid.
197. See Robert Travis Scott, PoliticsDelayed TroopsDispatchto N.O.; Blanco ResistedBush
Leadership Proposal,NEW ORL. TIMES Pic., Dec. 11, 2005, at 1.

198. Id.
199. Id. Governor Blanco was later overheard whispering to an aide that she should have
requested troops earlier. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Scott, supra note 197, at 1.
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But the governor is not alone in her aversion to ceding state authority
in a time of emergency. 23 One study reported that only two of thirty-eight
governors support the idea that the federal government act as the primary
handler of natural catastrophes. 2 4 Moreover, past presidents, "leery of the
image of federal troops patrolling in their own country or of embarrassing
state and local officials," have hesitated when mobilizing troops within the
country's borders. 2 5 The unwillingness of states to forfeit power, along
with the President's hesitation to deploy U.S. troops domestically, should
signal that there is indeed an important boundary between state and federal
sovereignty that deserves respect.
Furthermore, keeping the military away from the civilian sphere will
mitigate "turf wars" that may arise from police and military interaction.0 6
The intermingling of military and local law enforcement personnel evokes
loss of control, and calls into question which enterprise has supreme
authority.2 7 This territorial power struggle may distract both teams from
performing their jobs.0 ' By preventing the military from impinging on
civil law enforcement, state and federal roles can remain distinct.
3. Prevention of Military Misuse
Advocates of the PCA want to make clear the military's fundamental
mission: "preparing for and waging war., 2 9 To that end, some suggest that
the PCA not only remain law, but should be strengthened to discourage
"well-meant[,] but fear-driven misuse" of armed forces to enforce civilian
law. 210 Indeed, calling on the armed forces-soldiers who are trained to
use deadly force-to assist in civil law enforcement may lead to grave
abuses and unnecessary violence. 21 Because law enforcement would no
longer be a state-controlled activity, citizens may not be able to challenge
any alleged misconduct, and victims may be denied legal recourse for
203. See Leave Posse Law Alone, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 2005, at 12A.
204. Id. Coincidentally, the President's own brother-Florida Governor Jeb Bush--reportedly
had reservations about federal control of disasters. Id.
205. Robert Burns, Changes May Be On Wayfor Military'sRole in Domestic Emergencies;
Officials Consider Revising Act DatingBack to 1878, COLUMBIAN, Sept. 18, 2005, at A7.
206. Gizzo & Monoson, supra note 152, at 161-62.
207. See id. at 162.
208. See id. at 161-62.
209. Mark Sappenfield, DisasterRelief? Call in the Marines, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept.
19, 2005, at 1.
210. See Bloeser, supra note 93, at 25.
211. Noone, supranote 195, at 199-200.
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military abuses.2 12 For this reason, critics believe that standard military
rules of engagement are too powerful to use within America's
boundaries.2" 3
Critics also argue that domestic military missions will spread the armed
forces too thin.214 With current obligations in all comers of the world, and
an ongoing war on terrorism, scholars fear that "mission creep" and
information overload will result in a weakened security force.215 Moreover,
transforming soldiers into emergency first-responders will shift
accountability away from the agency whose job it is to act in a natural
disaster-FEMA.2 6 Thus, military engagement in natural disaster relief
will blur the rightfully distinct powers and purposes of military institutions
and federal disaster institutions.
C. Rationalefor Amending the PCA
1. The PCA Has No Stand-Alone Force
27
It is already questionable whether the PCA remains legally valid.
Positivist legal theory would demand repeal of, or change to, the PCA
because the law has no remaining force.21 Additionally, PCA critics assert
that the law was enacted only to repeal the Cushing Doctrine.21 9 If that is
true, then the PCA no longer has independent legal significance.
The numerous statutory and executive exceptions to the PCA further
erode its stand-alone value.22° Contrary to the legal principle that law must
212. Interview with Diane Mazur, University of Florida Research Foundation Professor of
Law, in Gainesville, Fla. (Jan. 27, 2006).
213. See McCall & Denning, supra note 29, at 31 (quoting a Pentagon official as stating "'We
are trained to fight and win the nation's wars. We attack, shoot things and people, destroy enemy
forces. We don't go around arresting folks."').
214. See Bloeser, supra note 93, at 27.
215. See McCall & Denning, supra note 29, at 32.
216. See Sappenfield, supra note 209, at 1 (noting that shifting the military's focus from war
to disaster relief does not provide an answer to the problem of federal and state emergency response
mismanagement).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 159-80.
218. Id.
219. See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC
DISORDERS 1789-1878 (Center of Military History, U.S. Army 1988) (noting that the PCA simply
means that troops cannot be deployed domestically on any lesser authority than that of Congress
or the President).
220. The numerous exceptions to the law cut back on the impact of the law itself. As jurist
Ronald Dworkin notes, exceptions to a given rule of law tend to weaken the gravitational force of

that law. ROBERT DwORKIN,

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

110-15 (1977).
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be consistent,221 the PCA is presently contradictory to other announced
rules of law.222 It is so riddled with exceptions that it can no longer be
viewed in its original context. 22 3 Moreover, opponents of the PCA could
point to Ronald Dworkin's enactment/gravitational force theory to
illustrate how the PCA is no longer valid authoritative law. 24 While the
enactment force of the PCA remains simply by the fact it remains on the
books, the exceptions to the PCA show a strong gravitation away from the
letter of the original law and toward a more federally integrated domestic
military presence. 225 Thus, while the PCA is still enacted law, its
effectiveness is greatly reduced because the gravitational force of its
exceptions has pulled away from the original policy underpinning the
6
law.

22

2. The PCA Should Reflect Present Military Mission and
American Attitudes
Traditions of institutions are not static; as members of institutions
identify new needs and new insights within their body, development and
change result. 227 Opponents of the PCA argue that changing or repealing
the PCA is necessary in order to be consistent with present-day military
objectives. 22' Recently, the mission of the U.S. military has become not
only to defend America, but also to defend democracy at home and
221. See FULLER, supra note 156.
222. See supratext accompany notes 124-51. Such a contradiction in law violates the internal
principles of legality as outlined by Lon L. Fuller. See FULLER, supranote 156, at 65-70. See also
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (when two contradictory laws exist at once, one
necessarily needs to be given effect to the exclusion of the other).
223. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
224. See RONALD DwoRKm, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-15 (1977). In his writings,
Dworkin contrasts a law's enactment force, or the core meaning of the rule, with its gravitational
force, which is the persuasive power of the law to influence decisions of the future. See id. For a
more extensive treatment of Dworkin's theory, see Robert C.L. Moffat, Judicial Decision as
Paradigm:Case Studies of Morality and Law in Interactionism, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 297, 326-3 7
(1985).
225. See text accompanying notes 128-54 (noting that both the Insurrection and Stafford Acts
have provisions that allow mobilization of armed forces without state approval).
226. See id.
227. ROBERT C.L. MOFFAT, THE SOCIAL DIMENSION, chs. 8, 6 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
228. See generally R.D. Huffstetler Jr., Disasters Made For Marine Corps-HasSkills to
Restore Order,Set Up Services, ATL. J. CONST., Dec. 19,2005, at Al 5 (the Marine Corps are tested
in the evacuation of noncombatants); Rowan Scarborough, Nation Building Elevated, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at AOl (reporting that the Pentagon announced they would elevate nationbuilding activities to have equal status with major combat operations).
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abroad.229 In fact, "stability operations" are now deemed part of the
military's core mission.230 As such, the military's nation-building
objectives parallel those tasks necessary to aid Americans during a natural
disaster. If the U.S. military must be committed to rebuild nations
overseas, it must also be premitted to rebuild cities at home. Thus, the
PCA should be changed in order to become flexible to strategic shifts in
its world mission.
The change in Americans' perception of the military also warrants a
change in the PCA. Present-day Americans view the military much more
" ' American troops no
favorably than it did at the dawn of the Revolution.23
longer symbolize suppression; instead, to some they represent "beacons of
freedom" at home and abroad.2 32 The rise of American nationalism postSeptember 11 th causes citizens to perceive soldiers as heroes, not villains,
and to perceive the Army as protector of safety, not an imposer of threat.
Consequently, Americans no longer mandate the artificial construct
separating civilian law enforcement from military operations when the
immediacy of a disaster requires otherwise.233
3. Natural Disasters Demand Objective, Swift, and Decisive Action that
Only the Military Can Provide
Hurricane Katrina proved that a catastrophe of such magnitude can
cause a complete breakdown in emergency response mechanisms at all
levels of government.23' Some critics argue that personal ties and emotions
hindered state officials' abilities to perform their jobs.235 Others believe it
229. American soldiers are presently called on to preserve the nation's peace and freedom, to
end tyranny, to free the oppressed, and to light the path to democracy for others. Military Call to
Duty, at http://www.army.mil/calltoduty/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
230. Scarborough, supra note 228, at A01.
231. Polls indicate that Americans view the military as the most respected government
institution. See David L. Leal, American Public Opinion Toward the Military (2005),
http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/l/123 (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
232. Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army, and General Dennis J. Reimer, Army Chief of
Staff, Veterans Day 1998 Message, at http://www4.army.mil/otf/speech.php?storyid-key=2576
(last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
233. See Felicetti & Luce, supra note 38, at 87.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 1-22.
235. For example, at least 200 New Orleans law officers left their posts following the
devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina. Some officers chose to assist family and loved ones. Some
officers simply threw their badges out the window and walked away. The reasons given for leaving
included: lack of support from the local government in dealing with the crisis; and psychological
problems with being in armed confrontation with people foraging for food and water in a desperate
situation (called looters and thugs by the authorities if they helped themselves). The loss of their
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was the lack of emotion and personal involvement of federal officials that
led to the slow and disorganized federal response.236 While complete
answers are not yet known, it is definite that confusion over
communication, control, and emergency protocol exacerbated the
devastating effects of this natural disaster.
Agencies like FEMA have proven that they are not organized to deploy
under situations that require an immediate response, and some believe
Americans cannot risk another bureaucratic breakdown.237 Consequently,
many believe that the military is the most appropriate solution to remedy
this confusion, 23' especially in light of its expanded duties in restoring
order overseas. 239 The military has the manpower, resources, coordination,
and personal detachment necessary to enter a chaotic disaster zone. 4 ° With
its chain of command in place, troops can "swiftly" restore order and legal
presence.24'

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE TO THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
THAT SAFEGUARD LEGAL INTENT AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
FLEXIBILITY FOR NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF

As has happened for over two hundred years, the role of the U.S.
military is again under scrutiny. A decision must be made whether to
modify the PCA so that it becomes congruent with other announced law,
or preserve the PCA and risk that its exceptions overtake its rule. The
author feels the best course of action is to converge these concerns into an
amended PCA that more clearly defines the purpose and parameters of the
law in the context of disasters.
The effect of these changes would not be so drastic as to revert to
Cushing era principles; 2 2 rather, these focused amendments would
announce the purpose of the law and provide the confines within which the
military may operate when a natural disaster occurs. This solution attempts
to harmonize the concerns voiced on both sides of the PCA debate, while
own families might have driven at least two officers to commit suicide. See Treaster, supra note
155, at 1.
236. "Pantson Fire," NEW ORLEANS TIMES (Picayune), Oct. 25, 2005, at 6.
237. See Huffstetler, supra note 228, at A1S.
238. See id.; Let Military Keep Order in Disasters,BALT. SuN, Oct. 6, 2005, at 17A.
239. See supra text accompany notes 227-30.
240. See Huffstetler, supra note 227, at A15.
241. Id.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
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transforming a once intentionally vague law into a clear, but flexible, rule
of law. Furthermore, once the PCA better complies with the principles of
legality, the law itself will be more internally moral, which will increase
society's obligation to abide by its rule.243 Thus, the remainder of this Note
will explore amendments to the PCA that may effectively guide lawmakers
in defining what constitutes acceptable law enforcement behavior in
disaster relief, and will include proposed legislation for such changes.
A. The Selection of Method in ConstructingValid Law
Successful completion of tasks is dependent upon the employment of
a method appropriate to that task.2" Law, too, is dependent upon the
method and means employed to create it.245 Thus, method cannot be taken
for granted, and a desire for quick reform of the PCA must not drive the
legislative process. Rather, method should drive process, for "[w]e must
know what is possible before discussing what is desirable." 2
The method used to amend the PCA will certainly confine the results
that can be achieved.247 While legislators have primacy in revising
established law, traditional legislative method must not compromise the
important method selection task at hand. Legislators, like legal scholars,
"have normally settled into a particular approach that suits their needs and
interests. It then becomes natural to perceive a greater rapport with other
colleagues who share the same general approach to the subject matter."24
To avoid this tendency, a bipartisan and independent committee of military
personnel, historians, academics, Homeland Security officials, FEMA
officials and legislators should convene to amend the PCA so that
politics-as a method--does not confine the result of assisting the
citizenry during a disaster. 49 If the blending of individual methods allows
243. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
244. See Lon Fuller, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 47, 50-51
(Kenneth Winston ed., 1981).
245. See id. at 50-51.
246. Fuller, supranote 244, at 50.This is in stark contrast to a utilitarian view that emphasizes
goals first, and process as only a means to reach the goal. See FULLER, supra note 156, at 197.
247. See Fuller, supra note 244, at 50.
248. See MOFFAT, supra note 227, ch. 1, at 18.
249. This is the most appropriate solution because each representing body comes from
different backgrounds and method processes. When boundaries and methods are crossed, an
entirely new approach is capable of being produced. See id. at 12. Thus, the need for this reform
must spur cooperation among bureaucratic, state and party lines. However, one must remember not
to lose order in the effort to create order. Lon L. Fuller, Positivismand Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to ProfessorHart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630, 657 (1958) ("as we seek to make our order good, we can
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the committee to be more successful in this endeavor, it will produce law
that is more viable.
Any method used should make compliance the defining feature of the
newly formed law. Compliance, in general, is always an integral aspect of
law.25 0 Features of legal compliance are found. in. Fuller's notion of
internal, procedural morality 5 '-the principles needed in order to create
purposeful law.252 His procedural conception of law is that nothing can be
law unless it is capable of performing law's essential function: to guide
behavior.25 3 To be capable of performing this function, the law must aim
to satisfy the principles of legality2 54 so that its rules are: 1) expressed 2in
57
26
general terms; 255 (2) publicly promulgated; (3) prospective in effect;
(4) expressed in understandable terms; 258 (5) consistent with one
another;259 (6) written so as not to require conduct beyond the powers of
the affected parties; 26 (7) stable so as not to be changed so frequently that
remind ourselves that justice itself is impossible without order, and that we must not lose order
itself in the attempt to make it good").
250. See Robert C.L. Moffat, Lon L. Fuller 1902-1978, The Philosophy of Law: An
Encyclopedia, Vol. I, 320-22 (Garland Publishing 1999).
251. Some scholars, particularly Hart, argue that Fuller's principles of legality are not a form
of morality, but rather measures of legal effectiveness. HLA Hart, Book Review of Fuller, the
Morality ofLaw, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (1965). However, Fuller agrees with Dworkin
that "order, coherence and clarity have an affinity with goodness and moral behavior," and thus
aligns his principles with the concept of morality. Lon L. Fuller, A Reply to Professors Cohen and
Dworkin, 10 VL.L. REv. 655, 666 (1965).
252. See Hart,supranote 251, at 1285-86. Internal morality means those "logically necessary
requirements in order to succeed in carrying out any given enterprise." See MOFFAT, supra note
227, ch. 8, at 2. Fuller specifically distinguished between the external morality of an enterprise (the
goodness of the task itself) and the internal morality of an enterprise (the degree to which the
activity is being carried out in accordance with the principles that constitute that task). Moffat,
supra note 250, at 320-22.
253. Fuller, supra note 251, at 657. To Fuller, law's essential function is to achieve social
order "through subjecting people's conduct to the guidance of general rules by which they may
themselves orient their behavior." Id
254. See generally FuLLER, supranote 156, at 33-91.
255. Id. Fuller agrees with the legal positivist John Austin that only general commands
represent true law, and thus, law that requires ad hoc decisions is not in fact law. See id at 39.
256. Id (asserting that laws cannot be followed if they are not first made known).
257. Id.(asserting that laws must give advance notice of the behavior they require).
258. Id.(asserting that clarity is necessary for law). However, Fuller acknowledges the
tradeoff he creates in that the more general a law is, the less clear it may be. See id
259. FULLER, supra note 156 (asserting that all existing law must be consistent with each other
for valid law to exist).
260. See id (asserting that a law must not demand the impossible).
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the subject cannot rely on them;2 6 ' and (8) administered in a manner
consistent with their wording.262 In Fuller's view, the internal morality of
law is most important, for without such morality, the "integrity" of the task
would be "impaired., 263 Consequently, the PCA committee must aspire to
comply with these principles for there to be any kind of law at all.2"
B. Renewing the Purposeof the PCA
The rationale for having an intentionally ambiguous rule is outdated.
There is no longer a need to delicately craft a vague provision in order to
secure the success of a newly reunited nation. 265 Rather, the twenty-first
century mandates that a clear PCA purpose be codified so that no time is
wasted interpreting the law when citizens' livelihoods are at risk.
The purpose of the PCA should clearly state the nation's commitment
to barring military control over a free people.266 This pronouncement will
bolster the liberties promulgated from this country's inception.267 Such a
purpose will preserve the original intent of the law through a clear
expression of its founding principle.
A narrower purpose should be set forth in a proposed emergency
provision of the PCA. The goals of military law enforcement duties in the
immediate aftermath of a natural disaster should be to (1) save lives, (2)
save property, (3) restore law and order and (4) consolidate response
efforts with state officials to achieve maximum relief efficiencies. Clearly,
a new PCA would establish the parameters in which the military could act
to achieve these goals during an emergency military mission.
Nevertheless, announcing these objective will put federal and state
officials on notice of the provision's procedural purpose.

261. See id. (asserting that law must remain stable so that citizens can adhere to what the law
demands).
262. See id.
Fuller's most important principle of legality is that the written law be congruent
with the applied law. See id.
263. Moffat, supra note 250, at 320-22.
264. See id.; see also Robert C.L. Moffat, Implicit Promise Keeping and Fuller's Internal
Morality of Law, Bft 11 Rechtstheorie 215 (1991) ("failure to comply at least minimally with the
procedures demanded by the principles of legality will fail to produce law.").
265. See supra text accompanying notes 56-78.
266. See Kealy, supra note 38, at 430-31.
267. McCall & Denning, supra note 29, at 33.
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C. Defining the Boundariesof the PCA
Defining the constructs in which the military may operate during a
natural disaster is a necessary addition to the PCA. Limitations on military
control will ensure that military power does not go unchecked. First, a new
PCA should specifically tie its application to the Army, Air Force, Navy
and Marine Corps. 268 It should also reference both the Insurrection and
Stafford Acts and expressly state under what circumstances the PCA
preempts those laws.269
Moreover, the law should clearly state what factors constitute an
emergency situation that requires the military to assume law enforcement
duties. This section also should allow for an automatic arrival of military
presence when the President decides that the threshold emergency factors
are met.27° However, a timetable for military law enforcement presence
should also be added so that-after a specified period of
time 271 -coordinated state officials would have the discretion to reduce or
remove military presence.272 This change should eliminate delays in
federal relief formerly attributable to communication miscues and
coordination delays between state and federal officials.27 3
In the case that there is such an emergency, the military should be
given authority to enforce the law at levels proportionate to that of civilian
officials. This short term suspension of total state control would facilitate
achieving long-term preservation of life, property, and structure in those
local communities. However, to check the military's domestic power, the
proposed emergency section should clearly outline the military rules of
engagement.274
268. Bloeser, supranote 93, at 30.
269. Doing so will comply with Fuller's principle of legality that laws should not contradict
one another.
270. Hurricane Katrina arguably proved that it is inefficient for the military to wait for a
governor's invitation to enter a state when the citizenry that the soldiers are called on to protect are
at risk.
271. A period of time consistent with the provisions of the Stafford Act, see supra text
accompanying note 148.
272. Interview with Danny James, 1st Lieutenant Merchant Marine, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
(Dec. 22, 2005).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 197-202.
274. For example, legislators could implement rules of engagement similar to the rules
provided to the military during the Rodney King verdict riots. Among the rules of engagement were
the following:
Minimum force must be used at all times when responding to civil disturbances;
warning shots are not permitted; deadly force may be used only if lesser means
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Additionally, the PCA should clearly state what type of military
conduct the law proscribes. The penalty provision of the PCA should be
enforced against all members of the military so that soldiers will choose
to stay within the confines of the PCA rules." 5 Of course, once these rules
have been enacted, they should be provided to all state and federal officials
so that each agency can plan to implement the new policies. 6
D. Sample of ProposedPCA Legislation
The following proposed PCA amendment represents a preliminary
version of what form the new PCA should take. While the author in no
way claims to be an expert at statutory drafting, she believes that the
general points expressed in the legislative draft below are important
factors to consider when shaping future legislation in this area.
18 U.S.C. s. 1385-Posse Comitatus Act.
(a) Declaration. The Congress hereby finds and declares that(1) because the United States of America was founded on the principle
that civilians should be free from military control; and
(2) because the Nation continues to be committed to barring military
encroachment over the free people of the United States of America; and
(3) because natural disasters often cause loss of life, loss of property,
and other human suffering and damage; and
(4) because natural disasters often disrupt law, order, and the normal
functioning of state governments and communities;
the federal government may in times of natural disaster call upon the U.S.
military to assist the efforts of the affected States in expediently restoring
law enforcement functions in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster,
but such assistance shall be limited to only those activities as allowed in
this chapter.
have been exhausted or are unavailable, the risk of harm to bystanders is not
significantly increased, and the purpose is self defense, prevention of serious
crime, destruction of vital public health or safety, or to prevent the escape of a
person who is a serious threat to persons or property.
See William C. Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September 11: The Role of
the Military in Counterterrorism Preparednessand Response, 64 LA. L. REv. 735,756-57 (2004).
275. See Kealy, supra note 38, at 432-33.
276. This is consistent with Fuller's principle that laws should be announced. See supra text
accompanying note 260.
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(b) Intent. It is the intent of the Congress, by this chapter, to allow the U.S.
military to assist State and local governments in orderly and coordinated
law enforcement duties in the immediate aftermath of a disaster so as to
promote:
(1) the saving of lives;
(2) the preservation of property;
(3) the restoration of law and order;
(4) the consolidation of response efforts with state and local officials
to achieve maximum disaster relief.
(c) Definitions. As used in this chapter(1) "Emergency work" shall mean engaging in the following activities:
(A) debris removal, including the clearance of roads and
construction of temporary bridges necessary to the performance of
emergency tasks and essential community services;
(B) search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass
care, emergency shelter, and provision of food, water, medicine, and other
essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons;
(C) provision of technical advice to state and local governments on
disaster management and control; and
(D) reduction of immediate threats to life, property, and public
health and safety;
(E) restoration of essential public facilities and services;
(F) provision of law enforcement only to the extent of restoring
order and law, and only until State efforts are sufficiently stabilized and
coordinated to resume full time law enforcement activity.
(2) "Emergency situation" shall mean a situation in which:
(A) a breakdown in state and local government communication and
relief coordination is so severe that the failure threatens the lives, property,
and rule of law in a given State; or
(B) the local, state, and federal agency relief efforts are wholly
insufficient to respond to the magnitude of the disaster response task at
hand.
(d) On those occasions that the Congress or President, in consultation with
state and federal disaster relief agencies, finds that a state is in an
emergency situation, the Congress or the President may request the U.S.
Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, or other part of the federal armed
forces to engage in emergency work essential to meeting immediate threats
to life, property, and public safety resulting from a major natural disaster.
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Such emergency work shall be conducted in conjunction with state, local,
and other federal relief.
(e) Length of Time of Military Engagement. If Congress or the President
calls upon the U.S. military to engage in emergency law enforcement in
an affected State as set forth in this chapter, the military shall remain in the
affected state for a maximum often (10) days, unless the Governor of that
state requests that military presence be extended. If the Governor requests
that the military presence be extended, the Governor will determine the
number of military to remain in the State and the timetable for military exit
from the State.
(f) Command of Military Engagement. If Congress or the President calls
upon the U.S. military to engage in emergency work in an affected State
as set forth in this chapter, the military will operate under the direction of
the Department of Defense, and will abide by non-combat domestic rules
of engagement proportionate to that of state and local civilian officials as
defined by the Department of Defense.
(g) Prohibited Activities.
(1) No member of the U.S. armed forces shall engage in any activity
that a state or local law enforcement official would be prohibited from
doing, including but not limited to using excessive force against civilians
in carrying out emergency work.
(2) No member of the U.S. armed forces shall exert authority over any
state or local official or agency while assisting in any way under this
chapter.
(h) Penalty. If any person willfully uses any part of the U.S. military for
any purpose not allowed by this chapter, such person shall be fined
$50,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(i) Scope of law. This law shall not be limited in scope by 10 U.S.C. ss.
331 et. seq. Or 42 U.S.C. ss. 5121 et. seq., and this law shall supercede all
other laws to the extent that one may conflict with the other.
All of the proposed changes to the PCA provide behavioral guidance
for military and civilian law enforcement personnel. Such clarity in the law
more closely follows the principles of legality that lead to functionally
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purposeful legislation.2 77 A revised PCA will provide clear guidelines for
what type of law enforcement behavior is permissible by the military
during an emergency situation. The law will be announced to those who
would act under the law, and all federal and state actors will be put on
notice of the changes through rule distribution. The changes are practical,
and make the PCA consistent with other recorded laws. Most importantly,
a changed PCA would make congruent the letter and spirit of the law.

V. CONCLUSION

Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent congressional hearings revealed
that this nation is ill-prepared for a serious natural disaster. Lawmakers
must act now to clear away the political debris that blocks the path to
citizen safety during an emergency. Notwithstanding the need for
revamped communications and accountability mechanisms for entities like
FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, amending the PCA is
one important step towards cleaning up state and federal coordination
following a natural disaster.
The limitations placed on military mobilization originates from the
concept that the country's first-responders to an emergency should be
those local and state authorities who know the community and have a
vested interest in securing its safety. However, it is now known that when
those authorities are responding to a crisis in which they themselves have
been personally and emotionally affected, local personnel may no longer
be the best relief resource. Instead, relief must flow from a coordinated
state and federal effort, and the military should be given the opportunity
to have a role in such disaster assistance.
Amending the PCA by restating its purpose and defining its boundaries
will codify what tacitly has been the law for decades: that the U.S. military
can and should be mobilized domestically to aid in disaster relief when
circumstances so demand. Expressly implementing this policy will neither
undermine civil liberties nor American identity; rather, it will bring needed
clarity to a purposefully ambiguous law, and increase efficiencies for
natural disaster first-responders.
Legislative reform will also provide significant social benefit. Without
the vagueness of the PCA paralyzing military relief, federal and state
agencies can work together more efficiently. A more efficient relief system
will drastically reduce the response time needed to spread vital aid. By
277. See supra text accompanying notes 255-62.
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reducing this response time, the government may conserve aid resources
and use them only as needed.
Amending the PCA will also establish a clear and unequivocal chain
of command in a domestic crisis. By allowing the military to enforce
domestic law in the context of an emergency, the amended PCA will
improve coordination and communication through its delineated chain of
authority. Consequently, the proposed recommendations will allow the
military to equip devastated regions with a solid infrastructure and support
system so that relief may promptly arrive immediately after a disaster
breaks.
Politicians, military personnel, and special interest groups must work
together to ensure that no more lives are lost because of bureaucratic
power struggles or ambiguous statutory language. Natural disasters are a
reality of life, but with meaningful amendments to the PCA, unnecessary
delays for relief do not have to be. For government, a new PCA will
initiate a new means for facilitating the prompt execution of emergency
relief assistance; for natural disaster victims, a new PCA will initiate the
calm after the storm.

